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Abstract—Resource -constrained distributed systems such as
the Internet of Things (IoT), edge computing and fog computing
are deployed for real-time monitoring and evaluation. Current
security solutions are problematic when there is a centralized
controlling entity. The blockchain provides decentralized security
architectures using proof-of-work (PoW). Proof-of-work is an
expensive process for IoT and edge computing due to the deploy-
ment of resource-constrained devices. This paper presents a novel
consensus algorithm called Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) to
replace Proof-of-Work and introduce authentication in such envi-
ronments to make the blockchain application-specific. This paper
implemented the Proof-of-Authentication system to evaluate its
sustainability and applicability for the IoT and edge computing.
The evaluation process is conducted in both simulation and
real-time testbeds to evaluate performance. Finally, the process
of Proof-of-Authentication and its integration with blockchain
in resource-constrained distributed systems is discussed. Our
proposed PoAh, while running in limited computer resources
(e.g. single-board computing devices like the Raspberry Pi) has
a latency in the order of 3 secs.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Consensus Algorithm, Proof-of-
Work, Proof-of-Authentication, Internet of Things (IoT), Re-
source constrained distributed systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a collection of “Things”
that can communicate and share information between different
applications to achieve certain goals. The IoT follows different
communications management than the TCP/IP stack, where
things follow an Identity Management Protocol to become
identified devices during data collection [1]. The IoT operates
at the lower lever of data collection and processing as shown in
Figure 1. The IoT combines the sensing layer and middleware
for efficient data collection and transmission, while data is also
transmitted to a higher layer (Edge Layer) for near real-time
data processing [2]. The edge layer includes a large number
of edge datacenters (EDC) and EDCs are distributed in nature
without central dependencies. This edge deployment makes
the IoT deployment sustainable by processing emergency data




Figure 1. Multi-layer architecture of resource-constrained distributed systems.
The combination of IoT and EDCs forms a distributed envi-
ronment with resource-constrained devices. Security becomes
a key requirement for these mission critical environments.
Several security solutions involving cryptography exist for
IoT and similar applications [4][5]. Cryptographic solutions
are broadly divided into two types: asymmetric cryptography
and symmetric cryptography. Symmetric cryptography is ap-
proximately 1000 times faster than asymmetric cryptography,
and therefore symmetric cryptography is widely accepted for
IoT infrastructure [6]. The IoT is a large part of resource-
constrained distributed systems, so it also adopts symmetric
cryptosystem for encryption and decryption. In either case,
there is always a central entity to initialize or process these
security mechanisms, i.e. a Key Distribution Center (KDC) for
symmetric cryptography and a Certificate Authority (CA) for
asymmetric cryptography. As a result, a single-point failure
may lead to a compromise of the whole system. There is al-
ways demand of decentralized security solutions for distributed
systems, and the blockchain is presently a widely accepted
decentralized security solution.
In a change in outlook, the blockchain disposes of the
requirement for any central entity between various users
executing data and financial transmissions by utilizing an
immutable, simple and decentralized public ledger. This pub-
lic ledger is distributed in nature, where individual network
participants maintain this database to keep track of network
transactions. A major issue with the original blockchain is
the cost of proof-of-work (PoW). PoW cannot be directly
implemented into resource-constrained distributed systems and
this paper proposes a new consensus algorithm named Proof-
of-Authentication (PoAh) to make the blockchain suitable for
resource-constrained distributed systems.
The novel contributions of the current paper that advance
blockchain technology are:
• Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) is proposed as a new
consensus algorithm for lightweight blockchain.
• The new consensus algorithm is validated for resource-
constrained distributed systems.
• Finally, Proof-of-Authentication is evaluated in both sim-
ulation and testbed environments.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner.
Section II presents background and motivation of this work.
The proposed novel Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) algorithm
is discussed in Section III. Experimental results are presented
in Section IV. Conclusions and future directions are summa-
rized in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM MOTIVATION
In 2008, the possibility of the blockchain was first presented
by a researcher who implemented the advanced digital cryp-
tocurrency known as bitcoin, where the blockchain is an essen-
tial piece of its framework [7]. Various cryptocurrencies with
cutting edge advances have appeared since then. For example,
Ethereum which presents uses contracts [2]. The decentralized
ledger is the key innovation of the blockchain, where users
can view the transactions related to them anytime they want,
however once approved and added to the blockchain, the
transactions can neither be erased nor adjusted, which makes
the blockchain irreversible and changeless. Every transaction
is checked by the members by methods for pre-characterized
validation and agreement instruments without confirmation or
validation by any central entity. This reduce the expense as
well as disposes of data corruption because of a single point
failure, since ledger duplicates are synchronized over all the
network participants [8].
The members of distributed networks can be any type of
user, institution or organization sharing a duplicate of the
ledger containing their legitimate transactions in a successive
sequence. The ledger is comprised of a sequence of blocks
as shown in Figure 2, connected together by their hashes in
sequential order to maintain data integrity and timeliness. Each
block consists of a set of transactions digitally signed by the
proprietor and verified by the rest of the participants before
being added to the block.
There are several consensus algorithms for the blockchain
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Figure 2. Block processing with transactions and hashing.
proof-of-relevance. This paper proposes a new algorithm
named Proof of Authentication [9]. A classification of various
consensus algorithms is shown in Figure 3.
Blockchain
Consensus Algorithm 
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Figure 3. Taxonomy of blockchain consensus algorithms.
III. THE PROPOSED PROOF OF AUTHENTICATION
Proof-of-Authentication is a new consensus algorithm pro-
posed in the current paper to make blockchain lightweight and
compatible for resource-constrained devices. This algorithm
follows traditional communications, where there are only
updates during block validation.
At the start of the process, individual precipitants/nodes
in the network generate transactions (Trx) with the data or
processes and combine them into a block. The transactions and
block formation details are as shown in Figure 2. The nodes
broadcast the blocks for further evaluation. Individual nodes
are responsible for public and private key generation (PuK and
PrK). This model uses the ElGamal method of encryption i.e.
y = gx(modp), where y is the public key and x is the private
key. The generator function g and prime number p are known
to the public network. Before node broadcast, the source node
uses its private key PrK, i.e. x, to sign the block and makes
its public key PuK, i.e. y, available to everyone.
There must be trusted nodes within the network for block
validation, where trusted nodes are deployed with the mini-
mum trust value required for being a trusted node and other
nodes have a trust value zero ‘0’. With each successful full
authentication of a block, trusted nodes gain trust values.
Once the block is received by the trusted node, it is
processed to evaluate its authenticity by getting the source
Algorithm 1: Procedure of the Proposed PoAh.
Inputs : All nodes in the network follow SHA− 256
Hash Individual node has Private (PrK)
and Public key (PuK)
1 Nodes combine transactions to form blocks
2 (Trx+) → blocks
3 Blocks sign with own private key
4 (SPrK)(block) → broadcast
5 Trusted node verifies signature with source public key
(VPuK)(block) → MAC Checking
6 if Authenticated then
7 block||PoAH(D) → broadcast
8 H(block) → Add blocks into chain
9 else
10 DROP the block
11 GOTO (Step− 1) for next block
node public key, i.e. y. Based on the asymmetric cryptography
property, the signature can be validated only with the use of
the public key. Based on the discrete log problem property,
one cannot compute the value of x, when other values are
known to them. After signature validation, the trusted node
also checks the MAC value for a second round of evaluation.
After successful authentication, the trusted nodes broadcast the
block to the network with PoAh identification. Following this,
individual nodes in the network find the PoAh information
from the block to add in the chain. Individual nodes compute
the hash of the block and keep it to link the next block and
the previously computed hash value is stored in the current
block to maintain the chain, as shown in Figure 2. The steps
of the PoAh procedure are given in Algorithm 1.
Trusted nodes use PuK (y) to verify the authentication of
the block, followed by MAC checking for a second round
of validation. Signature verification and MAC calculation
takes negligible time even with resource-constrained devices
[10], [11]. The next section provides experimental results for
scalability evaluation.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
The proposed Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) has been
evaluated by us in both simulation and testbed. The exper-
imental details for reproducibility and experimental results
presented as the quality of the proposed algorithm.
A. Simulation Evaluation
The Proof-of-Authentication consensus algorithm is sim-
ulated in the Python programming language to evaluate its
performance. For this experiment, there is a total of five
participants in the network with two miner/trusted nodes and
the block size is fixed to 35 bytes, where multiple transactions
are kept in one block. All participants of the network use asym-
metric key cryptography for the encryption and finally sign
the certificate with their own private key. The block format is
Table I
POAH TIME FOR AUTHENTICATION OF BLOCKS.











extended with more details in the context of simulation with
format ¡Source ID, “Signature”, MAC, Trx1, Trx2, . . . >. The
details of the block structure and block validation are shown in
Figure 4 and 5, respectively. Figure 6 shows a sample output
of PoAh evaluation.
Individual participants generate transactions and blocks, and
sign them with their own private key before broadcasting.
Trusted nodes validate the blocks with the source signature
but using its public key. After successful authentication, trusted
nodes again broadcast to all the participants in the network to
keep a copy of the block into their ledger. The simulation re-
sults indicate an average time for the Proof-of-Authentication
of 3.34 seconds. The average is computed from the PoAh time
from 10 iterations. The results from those 10 iterations are
listed in Table I, where the simulation follows the steps of
Algorithm 1.
B. Testbed Evaluation
The proposed Proof-of-Authentication is implemented in
a real-time testbed to evaluate its sustainability. The testbed
implementation includes five Raspberry Pis, where three Pis
are associated with multiple sensors (such as temperature,
humidity and touch) and the other two work as the trusted
nodes to the network. All Pis are configured with 1.2 GHz
64/32-bit quad-core ARM Cortex- A53 CPU, 1 GB LPDDR2
RAM at 900 MHz and Broadcom BCM2837 system-on-chip
and use the SQLite database to maintain the index, pub-
lic/private keys and cryptographic hashes. They are connected
with each other through the Internet. An individual Pi collects
data to form a block and then broadcasts it for authentication
by the trusted Pis which maintain a database to find the
public key of the source to verify the signature and broadcast
the authenticated blocks after successful authentication. This
implementation follows the step of Algorithm-1. The complete
testbed setup is as shown in Figure 7. With the process
of Proof-of-Authentication, the Pis take an average of 3.8
seconds while the total end-to-end time from block formation
to becoming a part of blockchain is 4.4 seconds. We have
concluded this number from 15 operations. The end-to-end
time is subjective based on the medium of communications
and computational power of the Pis. The testbed evaluation
is mainly focusing on finding the sustainability of Proof-
of-Authentication in resource-constrained distributed systems.
Figure 4. Block structure.
Figure 5. Block validation.
Figure 6. Sample output of PoAh.
The testbed implementation process follows Algorithm 1
strictly to get the scalability of the network system.
It may be noted that Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm while
running in high-performance computing resources has a la-
tency in the order of 10 mins. Our proposed PoAh while
running in limited computer resources has a latency in the
order of 3 secs. Thus, our proposed PoAh is at least 200×
faster than PoW which is used in traditional blockchain, and
hence is highly scalable for large datasets which will run faster,
will use minimal resources, and will have minimal energy
consumption footprint.
From the above theoretical and experimental studies, we
conclude that Proof-of-Authentication can replace Proof-
of-Work by introducing an authentication mechanism into
resource-constrained networks thus opening the door for scal-
able blockchain that can handle large amounts of data with
limited resources with smaller latency [10], [11], [9].
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a new consensus algorithm
named Proof-of-Authentication for lightweight blockchain.
Lightweight blockchain is always a key factor for resource-
constrained distributed systems to eliminate centralized
dependencies. The proposed consensus algorithm is validated
with analysis and experiments. The experiment is conducted
in both simulation and testbed environments to evaluate its
scalability. In the future work we plan to analyze the proposed
PoAh algorithm with bigdata sets in larger systems. The
security of the proposed algorithms for various benchmark
attacks will be undertaken in future work.
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